No.525
Keksi
No.537
>>534Look at the new castle signs, Erdogan is stubborn. TAF is moving assets into the area and was filmed in Saraqib city itself. There are even reports of Turkish shelling and skirmishes.
Aleppo had some of the conflict's most violent fighting in a long time, the death toll in a single day may have reached a hundred. HTS attacked with its elite fighters but doesn't have the upper hand.
No news from al-Bab.
No.538
>activity in /kc/
woah
No.539
>>537Erdop laying chess. Rook to M5.
Except all sides are dark.
No.544
>>542Srsly what kind of fucknut wants the escalation of the war?
I don't think much will follow. Turkey can't afford to actually enter in the conflict it would ruin the relations with Russia. Russia won't just stand down, they invested too much into that war, and finally their protegee is winning.
Tho I wonder the potential of the Turkish military.
No.553
>>544>Tho I wonder the potential of the Turkish military.They'd prevail against SAA and any other faction except maybe the best of the loyalists like Hezbollah. But Russia wouldn't allow it. Maybe as the situation on the ground is fluid, might makes right prevails and Erdogan and Putin haven't settled everything behind the scenes there could be a full skirmish with Russia not responding militarily. But afterwards Turkey would pay a price. That's why Erdogan won't go that far, he needs Putin. On the other hand he's trying to delay the inevitable rebel defeat indefinitely for whatever reason (refugees, Idlib as a bargaining chip) and the more he tries to do it the more he runs the risk of having incidents like this.
No.556
>>554>BinnishI thought Binland is in the North.
Oh. Obama Finn LundinGeez, those dudes dressed warmer than me in winter.
>>553Now Erdo has to find a way to backing out without losing face. But what if he can't? Will he grab even for the weakest excuse? This is an exciting point now, in this phase of the war.
No.590
>>589Their attack NW of Nayrab to Qaminas is interesting, it's a bold move and the spearhead of a flanking move on Sarmin which is the last stop before Idlib city itself. And if the breakthrough east of Saraqib makes more gains it'll threaten the rebel position in the Aleppo front.
Erdogan's whole effort to save Saraqib, which cost the heightening of geopolitical tensions and several TAF servicemen, has been rendered futile. To internal audiences he still uses a tone of bravado:
https://www.haaretz.com/amp/middle-east-news/turkey/turkey-demands-syrian-army-exit-rebel-areas-threatens-force-1.8498988?__twitter_impression=true>If the (Assad) regime does not retreat to areas behind the observations posts, Turkey will be forced to take matters into its own hands No.612
>>600So basically SAA attacked where the units of two rebel groups were next to each other? That's a good move. If they aren't controlled tightly from the same HQ, it is harder for them to cooperate and close up the gap.
>>610I wonder how long the SAA can keep on the pressure and hammer the opposing forces until they run out of strength.
No.617
>>612>So basically SAA attacked where the units of two rebel groups were next to each other? It's the same groups (JTS and HTS, also SNA when Erdogan calls). They have distinct territorial control but it's not segregated into north and south.
>I wonder how long the SAA can keep on the pressure and hammer the opposing forces until they run out of strength. No.618
They slowed down in the past couple of days but don't seem to have run out of momentum. It seems the biggest factor that can interrupt offensives is geopolitics.
No.626
https://southfront.org/great-victory-hts-militants-recapture-three-southeast-idlib-towns-from-themselves/Southfront claims the earlier HTS attack was a PR stunt and the villages had never fallen to Assad in the first place.
No.641
>>623Then SAA followed up with a push along the M5 and connected with the that bridgehead.
Meanwhile Turks getting busy.
No.663
It was probably artillery that hit Taftanaz airbase, not an airstrike.
No.667
Did Erdogan committed Turkey beforehand too much to help out rebels and now they can't back out? What's the point on them being there and dying? Will this be really an open conflict?
No.671
>>670
>re-align with US
What do you mean?
No.684
M5 is finally cleared while rebels attack Neyrab towards Saraqib. There are conflicting reports on who holds the city. A helicopter was shot down by either TAF or rebels with Turkish-supplied AA.
>>667He has the following reasons for his commitment:
-Sunk cost fallacy, he already poured a lot of resources into the rebels over the last decade.
-Strengthening his internal image. This, however, only applies to Islamists and MHP jingoists. The wider Turkish public supported actions against the SDF but it's doubtful if they value sacrifices for Idlib.
-Rhetorical sunk cost fallacy, as he made a big deal of the dead Turkish soldiers. Backing down now would make him appear weak.
-Idlib as a geopolitical bargaining chip. For it to have any value, the takeover of Idlib can only happen with his consent. If Assad can just march in on his own will then nobody needs to pay Erdogan a price for Idlib, and it has no such value. Thus he must establish deterrence so that an attack without his consent will fail.
-Ideology, he wants to LARP as the Ottoman Caliph.
-Refugees. Images of massive movements of civilian vehicles away from the frontline have been seen lately. Idlib already hosts populations from former rebel territory and its fall means migration into Turkey and possibly Europe on the short-term, and then few of those refugees want to return. But this is short-term thinking. With the final defeat of Idlib, and later sorting of eastern Syria, there'd be a normalization of Syria's international status, a cooling down of internal tension with maybe even amnesties and even the improvement of Syria's quality of life. All of this would increase the refugee return rate.
>>679That would leave a very exposed salient, it seems they're just taking advantage of the open terrain NE of Idlib to gain an advantage around the city and establish a buffer for the M5.
No.686
>>685>Idlib de-escalationMaking this term up is cynical in the first place (or if it wasn't actually used, the rationalization which this term describes) would make me as well seriously consider using sarcastic tone to describe the situation.
No.687
>>686Officially there is supposed to be de-escalation in place as negotiated in Astana on 2017 and further Russo-Turkish talks in 2018. That's what the observation posts are for, they're positioned along what used to be the frontline. Turkey also pledged to eliminate HTS, which it failed to do and HTS only grew stronger and defeated JTS in battle. Now apparently Turkish armored vehicles are finding their way into HTS hands immediately upon arrival in Syria. The official legalistic casus belli for every loyalist offensive since then has been continued HTS presence and the threat it poses to nearby Russian bases. Erdogan's legalistic explanation is also that the Syrian army is on the wrong side of the de-escalation line.
No.689
>>684This could be situation with potentially major consequences to the future, could even lead to Erdogan's downfall and the loss of influence of Turkey in the Middle East
I'm sure Iran keeps that in mind, turning from a conciliator into a joke.
>>687Well, lots of water flowed down the Danube since then, the rebels nowhere weigh the same on the negotiating table now. Justification will mater only after the fact. I think it's clear that Russia agreed on the set up of Turkish observation points just to win time and a relatively peaceful front for the Syrian govt. to gain a chance of sorting out the other fronts first. Their attitude was also cynical ofc, how could be de-escaltion exist when an armed group is preventing the restoration of the territorial and governmental unity of a country? It's like making another Korea. 65 years later it's still war.
No.708
>>705Was some article on RT which said according to Russia (Moscow or embassy can't remember) that the capture of the M5 was according to the de-escalation plans, it fulfills a requirement to establish a security zone. (Sounds like how the situation looks like in north Syria, with the M4.)
>Topkek Mountains National Park
>random firefight>14 y.o. diedHow a typical middle eastern casualty.
How this situation can even born? What the fuck wanted the achieve? "Hurr durr leave our country!" Meanwhile US troops were liek "but dudes we just here to keep you safe! Fuck this ungrateful sandniggers!".
No.715
>>713I think they'll want that road too which leads from Aleppo to Afrin (which touches the Kurdish held Menagh Airbase).
No.716
>>715It doesn't matter much, it just leads to Turkish-occupied Syria which is out of bounds for any offensive. And that stretch of yellow territory is already under joint control.
No.719
>>716It is part of the road network which runs around these would be security zones. Right now I think these rebel areas will be transformed into buffer zones where the refugees will be sent back from Turkey. I don't think SAA will be advance more to west by much at Idlib. They'll cut that corner at Aleppo, along that road, and that's it.
Then only one zone left in the north (well two) not in rebel hands.
No.720
>>719There's the M4 highway which Turkey also had pledged to open and didn't follow through. Assad may not take all of it but at the very least the southern salient can fall. Only problem is that it's got harder terrain.
No.726
>>720Hmm that runs straight to Latakia. They'll want that.